Guardrails And Safety easy
An agent can send emails through a tool. You added an output classifier that blocks harmful final responses. In a test, an injected document made the agent email a customer list to an outside address, even though the final reply was blocked. What should change?
- A Gate the email tool itself, e.g. restrict recipients or require user confirmation before sending.
- B Make the output classifier stricter so it blocks more responses that mention email addresses.
- C Move the output classifier earlier so it scans the user's message before the agent starts.
- D Lower the model temperature so it is less likely to follow unexpected instructions in documents.
Answer: A. Gate the email tool itself, e.g. restrict recipients or require user confirmation before sending.
Filtering the output is not enough when **the action has already happened**, so the control has to sit on the tool call itself. Recipient limits or confirmation add friction for users but stop unbounded actions. A stricter classifier (B) still runs after the email is sent. Output-only filtering is adequate only for agents whose tools have no side effects.
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