Guardrails And Safety easy
An agent answers questions about a user's own orders by generating and running SQL. Which database credential setup best limits damage if a prompt injection succeeds?
- A A read-only role limited to the orders data for the current user, enforced in the database.
- B An admin role, with a strict system prompt forbidding DELETE, UPDATE, or DROP statements.
- C A read-write role, with an output filter that blocks responses containing raw SQL text.
- D A read-only role on all tables, since reads alone cannot cause harm to the business.
Answer: A. A read-only role limited to the orders data for the current user, enforced in the database.
**Privilege isolation** means a compromised turn can only touch what the current user could already see, at the cost of more setup such as row-level security or scoped views. Read-only on all tables (D) is tempting but still lets an injection read other users' data, which is an exfiltration risk. Broader read access is acceptable only for data that is public to every user.
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