Guardrails And Safety hard
A finance-ops agent can issue refunds through a tool. Before each refund call executes, an LLM judge reviews it. An injected instruction in a customer email convinced both the agent and the judge to approve a $9,000 refund. What design change best prevents a recurrence?
- A Replace the judge with a larger frontier model, since a more capable reviewer is less likely to be fooled by the same text.
- B Enforce a fixed amount threshold in the tool server, above which refunds wait for human approval with full context.
- C Show the judge only the tool arguments, never the customer email, so injected text cannot reach the reviewer's context.
- D Run the judge three times at nonzero temperature and require unanimous approval before the refund tool may execute.
Answer: B. Enforce a fixed amount threshold in the tool server, above which refunds wait for human approval with full context.
An LLM judge shares the agent's failure mode, so its errors are correlated with the agent's, and a deterministic limit with **human escalation** bounds the worst case. The tradeoff is latency and staffing cost on high-value refunds, while low-value refunds stay automated. Hiding the email from the judge removes the attack text but also the evidence needed to judge legitimacy. The judge then just approves any well-formed arguments.
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Get the appRelated questions
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